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THE BASIC IDEAS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS AS FOUND IN THE
"SUMMA THEOLOGICA"*
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST** and FREDERICK A. COLLINS, JR.
INTRODUCTION
URING the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when all juris-
L prudential theories were more or less under the influence of what
might be called "secular natural law," it was commonly thought that
an entirely new approach to juristic thinking had been discovered.
This general belief was due almost completely to Pufendorf who
claimed that there existed no natural law in the middle ages. He made
the totally unfounded assertion that Grotius was the true founder of
the "Natural Law School," and that to himself goes the credit of hav-
ing put natural law on a strictly scientific basis.' His belief, undoubt-
edly, is but the result of the general disregard in which the middle
ages and scholastic thought in particular were held during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Pufendorf convinced himself that the
schoolmen had spread great darkness over the whole field of philo-
sophical and legal thinking. He frequently called the middle ages
"regnum tenebrarum."'2 And Christian Thomasius-disciple of Pufen-
dorf-in his "Historia Iuris Naturalis Paulo Plenior" (1719), refer-
ring to the middle ages, often uses the phrase, "misera conditio iuris
naturalis." Pufendorf's attitude caused a great and lasting breach in
the development of the legal-philosophical tradition of the Western
world. This was due, primarily, to the great scholarly reputation which
Pufendorf-unwarrantedly-enjoyed throughout the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, during which time he occupied the place of a
nearly uncontested leader among juristic thinkers. The result was that
*EDrroR's NoTE: In submitting this article to the REVIEw, Dr. Chroust
wrote: "It has always been felt . . .that a short and simple presentation of
St. Thomas's jurisprudence would be of great help to the student of juris-
prudence. It is, however, impossible for the average student to make use of
all the Thomistic sources and the Thomistic literature, since the amount of
prescribed reading in the general course of jurisprudence-at Harvard and
elsewhere-is already enormous. On the other hand, it has been my personal
experience that, even among non-Catholic students, a great interest exists
for Thomistic jurisprudence, which would be greatly increased if some kind
of simple but thorough presentation of this topic could be made available to
the average student." The editors of the REVnw believe that this article is
of the type of which Dr. Chroust writes.
**Former member of the German bar.
IPUFENDORF, SPECIMEN CONTROVERSIARUM, C. 1, sec. 4; and c. 5, sec. 22.2 Ibid., c. 1, sec. 1 and 5.
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this disdain for the schoolmen became somewhat of an academic
"dogma," the more so, since no one felt it necessary to venture beyond
Grotius or Pufendorf in order to learn what had actually been done
in the field of jurisprudence long before the arrival of Grotius. So it is
not altogether surprising that neither he, nor the many natural law
thinkers following him could appreciate the schoolmen and their im-
portant achievements in the domain of natural law.
Of course, not all the blame can be laid at the feet of Pufendorf.
At approximately the same time, the first comprehensive "history of
philosophy" appeared under the significant title: "De Doctoribus
Scholasticis Corrupta Per Eos Divinarum Atque Humanarum Rerum
Scientia" (1665)-by Adam Tribbechovius. In 1742 Brucker's "His-
toria Critica Philosophia"3 was published, which likewise was based
on an "anti-scholastic" approach to the subject. These two books did
much to open a wide gap between the philosophy of the middle ages
and that of "modern" times, becoming somewhat the standard "text-
books," consistently imitated by subsequent works on the history of
philosophy.
This general "reaction" against scholastic thought had its prime
source in the rise of a new type of philosophy which tried, in an inde-
pendent manner, to solve the problems which it had in common with
theology. From a mere presentation or defence of the accepted Church
dogma it passed to its criticism, and finally, in complete independence
of religious interests, sought to derive its new teachings from the
sources which it thought it possessed in the "lumen naturale," that is,
in human reason and experience.4 Thus all that the middle ages had
contributed to man's knowledge and moral comfort was thrown out as
unworthy even of research. It was this complete break with the tradi-
tion that made for a long time to come the medieval mind seem not
understandable to "modern" minds.5
By doing what the men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
felt it beneath them to do, that is, by making a thorough study of the
sources of medieval philosophy, we should be able to change rather
drastically the grim picture painted by Pufendorf and others. As is
probably true of many great philosophical works of lasting importance,
3 Brucker's "Historia Critica Philosophiae" was probably Kant's main source
of historical information.
4 Compare, for instance, Laurentius Valla, "Dialecticae Disputationes contra
Aristotelicos" (1499), III, 9; Bernhardinus Telesio, "De Natura Rerum Juxta
Propria Principia" (1566), Prooemium; Francis Bacon, "The Advancement of
Learning" (1609), III, 1 (Works, edit. Spedding, I 539) ; Nicholaus Taurellus,
"Philosophiae Triumphus" (1573), I, 1; Aureolus B. Paracelsus, "Das Buch
Paragranum" (1565), edit. Hauser, II, 23 et sequ.; Giordano Bruno, "Della
Causa, Principio et Uno" (1584), I, 2 and 6 et seq.
5 See, in this connection, H. Heimsoeth, "Die sechs grossen Themen der
abandlaendischen Philosophie und der Ausgang des Mittelalters," 2d edition,
Berlin, 1934.
[Vol. 26
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
a germ of almost every school of jurisprudence may be found in the
"Summa Theologica." But two are particularly prominent-primarily
that of natural law, and secondarily that of the social-philosophical
school.6
It was such great thinkers as St. Augustine, Alexander Helensis,
Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, and especially St. Thomas Aquinas
who elaborated thoroughly those bases of natural law that Pufendorf
could not believe were to be found in the writings of the schoolmen.
It is safe to say that such legal systems as those of Pufendorf,
Thomasius, or Wolff, which were supposed to be entirely new systems
of natural law in contradistinction to the scholastic systems, were in
their essence nothing but a revival of scholastic legal thought, with
very little change; much inferior, however, in "quality" as well as in
understanding the real problem of natural law.
St. Thomas divided his philosophical system of law into three major
sections: 1. The Eternal or Divine Law, 2. The Natural Law (Lex
Naturalis), and 3. The Human Law. Under each there are several
subdivisions. We shall consider them in this, his own, order.
A rough diagram of St. Thomas Aquinas's system of law may be of
help in understanding each part in its relation to the whole, and to
the other parts:
I. Lex Aeterna or Divine Law.
II. Lex Naturalis, which partakes in, and is derived from the
Divine Law. This is divided into (a) primary natural law, and (b)
secondary natural law. The latter derived from the primary natural
law principles.
III. Human or Positive Law which derived from natural law by
the use of human reason, and must be in conformity with the Divine
and natural laws. It is necessary because the precepts of the natural
law are quite often blurred in the mind or heart of man through sin.
LEx AETERNA OR DIVINE LAw
The great task of St. Thomas Aquinas was to complete the process
of reconciling the Aristotelian-Alexandrian tradition with Christian
thought, a task begun by Alexander Helensis, Banaventura, and Alber-
tus Magnus. His ultiniate endeavour was to formulate and ground
an absolute and harmonious "cosmic order" where everything would
have its particular place according to its specific characteristics or
properties. Therefore one of his main tasks underlying his "Summa
Theologica" was to determine the-position of man in this eternal and
wise order of the created Universe. In this created world order
6 JHEPING, DER ZwEcK Im RECHT, 2d edition, II, p. 161 ff. (quoted in footn. 57).
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St. Thomas Aquinas conceives of three realms.7 First, the "Ontological
order" of things according to which everything existent is determined
by its desire of preserving its being. Secondly, the "cosmic-vitalistic
order" which deals with such teleological functions as procreation and
the satisfaction of other vital animal needs that nature has taught all
animals according to the eternal order of things. Thirdly, the sphere
of the "animal rationale et sociale," which is the realm of moral per-
fection-to know the truth about God, and to live in society.
In all these realms there is but one basic law-the Lex Naturalis,
by means of which God maintains order within the created Universe.
Since man is a rational creature, endowed with the faculty to know
the truth about God, the Lex Naturalis becomes for him in particular
a participation in the Lex Aeterna,8 that is, a participation in the
Divine Wisdom. Both these concepts, the Divine reason and the Lex
Aeterna, were first developed by St. Augustine. St. Thomas frequently
refers to him as an authority, and particularly as regards these
notions.9 Since the Lex Aeterna, which "is nothing else than the type
of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements," 10 con-
stitutes the foundation of St. Thomas's theory of law, and because he
himself credits St. Augustine as being his authority, we shall deal
shortly with St. Augustine's Lex Aeterna, in order to give us a better
understanding of St. Thomas's basic position.
St. Augustine says in "De Diversis Quaestionibus," quaest. 79, art.
1, "est enim lex universalis, divina sapientia." In "De Libero Arbitrio,"
I, 6, he furthermore states: ... "that Law which is called the Supreme
Reason, which must always be followed, and through which the bad
ones earn (deserve) the miserable, and the good ones the blessed life,
through which all that we speak of as temporal is carried out in the
right manner, and is directed (changed) in the right way, cannot be
understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal." And in
the same work at I, 5, he asserts that the Eternal Law exists in the
mind of God where all things are directed to their proper ends. And
again he says that, "the Eternal Law is Divine Reason, the Will of
God, which orders us to maintain the natural order ... "11 Thus St.
Augustine founded and defined the basic concept of the whole of the
natural law of the middle ages, by introducing the concept of the Lex
Aeterna.12 It is most important to remember that his Lex Aeterna is
7 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 2.
8 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 2; art. 3; art. 4; quaest. 93, art. 6.
9 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 1; art. 2; art. 3; art. 4; art. 5; quaest. 93, art. 1; art. 2;
art. 3; art. 4; art. 6.
10 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 1.
21 "Contra Faustum," XXII, 27.
12 St. Augustine carried his Lex Aeterna principle into his Lex Naturalis. For
the Lex Aeterna is indelibly impressed on the soul of man. "Ex hac ineffabili
atque sublimi rerum administratione, quae fit per divinam providentiam,
quasi transscripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem, ut in ipsa vitae
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not an impersonal law or "cosmic reason" like that of the Stoics to
which God, too, would have been subjected, but it is the personal will
of God Himself.
St. Thomas Aquinas's conception of the Lex Aeterna is very simi-
lar to that of St. Augustine. It is the objective and absolute a priori
of everything that is called a "rule and measure." It exists in itself
and can only be conceived through itself. The Divine intellect eternally
remains the measure and rule of all things, and each thing has truth
to the degree that it presents the Divine intellect. So a Divine concept-
here the law-is true by reason of itself.13 St. Thomas Aquinas states
that the law is the practical reason emanating from a ruler. The created
Universe is ruled by Divine providence, consequently the community
of the Universe is governed by Divine reason. So the very Idea of the
eternal government of all things in God has the nature of a law.
And since the Divine reason is not subject to time, but is eternal, its
law, too, must be eternial. 14 All things are created by Divine wisdom,
and that type of Divine wisdom which moves all things to their due
end bears the character of a law. Hence the Lex Aeterna is nothing
but Divine wisdom directing all actions and movements. 5
St. Thomas Aquinas gives four reasons for the necessity of the
Lex Aeterna. The first is that man is ordained to an end-to eternal
happiness. Since he could not achieve this end through his own powers,
it is necessary that he be directed to it by a law given by God. But it
is his second reason that is of greatest importance for his theory of
law. He says, "because, on account of the uncertainty of human
judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different
people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different
and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know
without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid,
it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law
given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.""' His third
reason is that man is not competent to control the interior workings
huius conversatione moribusque terrenis homines talium distributionum
imagines servent." (De Diversis Quaestionibus, quaest. 53, art. 2.) Thus we
find in ourselves the ultimate principles of right and justice. The Lex Naturalis
is but the preservance of the eternal "cosmic order," as expressed in the Lex
Aeterna. "Deus ordinavit omnia et fecit omnia . . . et gradibus quibusdam
ordinavit creaturam a terra usque ad coelum, a visibilibus ad invisibilia, a
mortalibus ad immortalia. Ista contextio creaturae, ista ordinatissima pulchri-
tudo, ab imis ad summa conscendens, a summis ad ima descendens, nusquam
interrupta, sed dissimilibus, temperata, tota laudat Deum." (Psalm 144, 13.)
And in "De Libero Arbitrio," (I, 6, 15) he states: "Ut igitur naturae legis
notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo, verbis explicem, ea est,
quae iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima."
13 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 93, art. 1.
14 Ibid., quaest. 91, art 1.
S5Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 1.18 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 4.
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of other men, and yet that being necessary to virtue, the Lex Aeterna
has to intervene or supervene. His fourth reason is that human laws
alone could not forbid or punish all evil deeds, because if it tried, it
would hurt more than help the common good.
There St. Thomas Aquinas has stated the essence of Christian
thought-the final resort to God. He has pondered the enigma of
"different people forming different judgments on human acts," pre-
sumably one judgment being as firm and reasonable (as far as the
human could see) as the other. And yet there had to be for him, as
there must for all men with intellectual and spiritual intensity, some
set of values on which he could base his own philosophy and convic-
tions. And since the thought of his days, like all true Christian thought,
abhorred the thinking in terms of the relative, he went to God, "in
order... that... (he might) ... know without any doubt what he
ought to do and what he ought to avoid."'17 The idea that his premise
was not fully demonstrable as far as natural reason is concerned,
seemed, in his Faith, a perfectly natural thing, and never gave him
pause. For he knew that it was unshakable and true.
All men, some more and some less, know of the Lex Aeterna. 18
For "by way of participation, the Lex Aeterna resides in that which
is ruled and measured." 19 But no one can know the Lex Aeterna in its
entirety; yet every rational creature knows it in its reflection or effect.
Every knowledge of the truth is a kind of reflection and participation
of the Lex Aeterna, which is in itself the unchangeable truth. ' 20 All
that is in things created by God . . . is subject to the eternal law:
while things pertaining to the Divine nature or essence are not sub-
ject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself."21
All laws insofar as they partake of right reason, are derived or
proceed from the Lex Aeterna. Nothing is just and lawful but what
has been drawn from the Lex Aeterna.2 s For "the power of the second
mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover.
'2 3
God imprints on the whole of the created Universe the principles
of its proper actions, making thus all actions and movements subject
to the Divine government, to the Lex Aeterna.24 "It is evident that all
things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from
its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to
their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature
7 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 4.
Is Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 2.
19 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 6.
20 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 3; quaest. 91, art. 2.
21 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 4.
22 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 3.
23 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 3.
24 Ibid., quaest 93, art. 4.
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is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far
as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for
itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason,
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. '25 It is
God, the Creator of all things, who imprints on the soul of man the
principles of his proper actions. This constitutes man's participation in
the Lex Aeterna, a participation which is called the Lex Naturalis
Moralis, and which forms the ultimate source of his own law-the
human law.
LEX NATURALIS (MoRAmis)
In the field of the Lex Naturalis (Moralis), or in short, of the
natural law, too, St. Thomas Aquinas had the benefit of St. Augustine's
works. They both arrived at the basis of their natural law in a similar
manner. To St. Augustine and St. Thomas the Lex Aeterna is the
absolute and objective a priori. The natural law stands in its relation
to the Lex Aeterna as a "subjective" a priori of right and justice,
being imprinted on the soul of man. The natural law is, in varying
degrees, the rational creature's participation in the Divine reason, the
Lex Aeterna-which exists only in the mind of God. It is, in other
words, the "imprint" of the Lex Aeterna on men's souls.
26
The natural law in St. Thomas Aquinas is primarily an ontologi-
cally grounded "regula et mensura," an "ordinatio ad finem. 2 7 In the
"Summa Theologica," I. II., quaest. 91, art. 2, he says, "... law, being
a rule and measure can be in a person in two ways: In one way, as
in him that rules or measures; in an other way, as in that which is
ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as
it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore . . . it is evident that
all things partake somewhat of the eternal law .... Now among others,
the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excel-
lent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence. . . and this
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the
natural law."
As to the manner in which man is able to become aware of the
Lex Aeterna, in order to make it the basis of his laws, St. Thomas
asserts that man is conscious of the Lex Aeterna, and, therefore, also
conscious of the natural law, "because the rational creature partakes
thereof (of the Lex Aeterna) in an intellectual and rational manner,
25 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 2; and art. 4.28 St. Augustine, "De Diversis Quaestionibus," 53, quaest. 2.
27 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 90, art. 1; art. 2; art. 4; quaest. 91, art. 6;
quaest. 93, art. 3; quaest. 95, art. 3; quaest. 96, art. 1; art. 2.
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therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature
is properly called a law, since law is something pertaining to reason. "28
In this point St. Thomas differs from St. Augustine, who claims that
the soul is intuitively certain of the idea of justice which is in-
eradicable.29
The precepts of the natural law are discovered by reason. For
natural law is man's participation of the Lex Aeterna.30 The human
reason cannot know the Divine reason perfectly and completely. But
the speculative reason of man does have a participation in the Divine
reason, whereby we have within ourselves a knowledge of certain gen-
eral principles of right action,31 which are called "natural law."
The great and important innovation of Thomistic natural law
thinking consists in the use of the "natural practical reason"3 2 of man.
This "practical reason" functions parallel to the "natural speculative
reason."3 3 "Ratio speculativa et practica" becomes a standing formula
with St. Thomas, thereby ending the unchallenged supremacy of the
speculative reason. The "practical reason" is on an equality with the
speculative reason, inasmuch as the structure of both is identical. "A
law is the dictate of practical reason. Now it is to be observed that
the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative
reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions. '3 4 From
2s Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 2. See also quaest. 90, art. 1. It is worthwhile to note
that scholastic thinkers always speak of Lex Naturalis, and not of Ius
Naturale, as did the "secular natural law" thinkers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. For all law (lex) is based on an obligation or duty.
See, for instance, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaesL 90, art. 1. "For lex is
derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one to act." Compare SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 97, art. 1. Hobbes seems to have grasped the
spirit of the scholastic natural law when he says, that "lex enim vinculum est,
ius libertas (licence). (De Cive. cap. 14, 14, n. 3.)
29 St. Augustine, "Confessiones," II, 4. See also footnote 14. The nation of the
lex naturalis-which is impressed on our soul ("De Diversis Quaestionibus,"
quaest. 53, 2)--comes to us through the use of reason, while through our
moral conscience we become intuitively aware of the fact that the Lex Aeterna
is the true essence, the last resort of all that is called natural law. It is our
moral conscience, which through the process of "recollection" remembers
the "nucleus" of all natural law, that is, the eternal law. This notion of
"recollection" of the eternal law, of the "essence" of natural law is distinctly
Platonic.
30 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 2.
31 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 90, art. 2; quaest 94, art. 1; quaest. 91, art. 2;
quaest. 94, art. 6; quaest .95, art. 2.
32 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; art. 4; quaest. 94, art. 1; art. 2; art. 4.
3 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 94, art. 2. See, however, quaest. 94, art 4:
"The speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things . . . The prac-
tical reason ... is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions
are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general
principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we
encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same
in all men, both as to principle and as to conclusions . . . But in matters of
action, truth or practical recitude is not the same for all, as to matters of
detail, but only as to the general principles."
3 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3.
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naturally known indemonstrable principles we proceed to more particu-
lar determinations. The place of the practical reason in the natural law
is to discover and formulate a practical human law.3 5 "The precepts
of natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of
demonstration are to the speculative reason; because both are self-
evident principles.1
3 6
There are several principles or precepts of natural law, all of them,
however, based on a common foundation. "Now as 'being' is the first
thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so 'good' is the first
thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which
is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the
aspect of the good. Consequently, the first principle in the practical
reason is one founded on the notion of the 'good,' viz., that 'good' is
that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law,
that 'good' is to be done and pursued, and 'evil' is to be avoided. All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that what-
ever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil)
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done,
or avoided.1
3 7
This is to St. Thomas Aquinas the "principium per se notum" and
"indemonstrabile," the common foundation on which all laws are
based, the highest principle and first precept of law. Previously he had
already demonstrated that the natural practical reason can perceive
only certain most general principles or precepts, but never all of the
different precepts which are contained in the Lex Aeterna.38
The most general principle of law, namely that the good is to be
pursued, and the evil to be avoided,3 9 constitutes a self-evident princi-
ple, from which are drawn "first, certain most general precepts that
are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed
precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first
principles." 40
"As regards the general principles whether of speculative or practi-
cal reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known
to all." 41 And since these principles are instilled into man's mind by
God,42 they can never be 'blotted out of the hearts 9f men.43 Thus
35 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 94, art 4.36 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 2. See also quaest. 91, art, 3; quaest. 94, art. 4.
3 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 2.38 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 1.
39Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 2.
40 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 6. See also quaest. 91, art 3.
41 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4.
42 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 4. See also quaest. 91, art. 4; quaest. 93, art. 5; quaest.
94, art. 4.
43Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; art. 6; quaest. 93, art. 6; quaest. 94, art. 4; art. 6.
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they never change.44 The ultimate principles of right and justice, of
goodness and rectitude are immutable.
From the general precepts of natural law, by means of which the
rational creature partakes of the eternal law,45 follows the "secondary
natural law" which contains more detailed precepts, and which pro-
vides an immediate basis for the human law, that is, for the "adminis-
tration of justice." This "secondary natural law" 6 is but a body of
conclusions drawn from the "primary natural law," from the general
and basic principles of natural law.4 7 It constitutes that very instance
which gives true authority to all human laws. Hence the need for
human reason to proceed from the general principles of natural law
in order to sanction human law. 48 While the "primary natural law"
cannot be abolished from the hearts of men, the "secondary natural
law" can be blotted out, either by evil persuasion, corrupt habits, and
vicious custom, or by certain human laws which are contrary to the
natural law.49 "The natural law, as to general principles, is the same
for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain mat-
ters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general prin-
ciples, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to recti-
tude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail ...
by reason of certain obstacles.
'5
These conclusions drawn from first principles cannot always be
drawn with absolute certainty. For "the practical reason is concerned
with practical matters which are singular and contingent. ... Where-
fore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demon-
strated conclusions of science." 51 The fact that these conclusions lack
inerrancy does not lessen, however, their importance. "Nor is it neces-
sary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but
according as it is possible in its own particular genus."52 The secondary
principles of natural law are not valid for all times and all places, but
do, and must change.53 For the "practical reason," which draws these
conclusions, called "secondary natural law" principles, is concerned
with matters that are "contingent," in other words, with human actions,
and not with things. 4 And the more "contingent" it becomes as we
descend to matters of detail, the more frequently defects are encoun-
44 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 5.
45 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3.46 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4; art. 5, art. 6.
47lbid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 94, art. 4; quaest. 95, art. 2; art. 4.4S Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 4.
-9 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 6
50 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4.51 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3. See also quaest. 94, art. 4.
52 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3. Also quaest. 92, art. 2; quaest. 94, art. 4.
53 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4; art. 5.
54 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4.
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tered and alterations needed. Because "the truth is not known to all
men as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles
which are called common notions." 55
The "contingent matters" to which St. Thomas Aquinas refers are
the "human matters," which are extremely varied as time and place
change. Thus it will be impossible to have detailed laws governing
human actions that will be just in every instance. It is most under-
standable, therefore, that St. Thomas Aquinas declares that conclusions
derived from first principles are variable, though the first principles
remain altogether immutable.56 However, these changes can only be by
"addition," to supply what was wanting in the natural law. "Nothing
hinders the natural law from being changed; since many things for the
benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural
law, both by the Divine Law, and by human laws."5 7
POSITIVE OR HUMAN LAW
St. Thomas Aquinas states that the precepts of law are concerned
with human acts or "human matters." So the third major problem with
which he deals is whether there is such a thing as a Positive or Human
Law that controls human acts. He concludes that "it is from the pre-
cepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable princi-
ples, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular
determination of certain matters. These particular determinations,
devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other
esential conditions of law be observed . . " 5'8 Man must have laws
framed by man because he cannot achieve perfection of virtue-which
is his end in life-by himself. The object of the law is to let man have
peace and virtue. Man cannot gain virtue by himself alone because
55 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 4.
56 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 2; art. 4; quaest. 95, art. 5. St. Thomas Aquinas's notion
of a "secondary natural law" constitutes one of the most important inno-
vations in the field of natural law thinking. It was taken up by Hugo Grotius,
who calls it "ins naturae pro certum rerum statu," or "ius naturae non proprie,
sed reductive" (De Iure Belli ac Pacis, I. cap. 1, sec. 10). Pufendorf speaks
in this connection of a "ius naturae hypotheticum," in contrast to "ins naturae
absolutum" (Ius Naturae et Gentium, II, cap. 3, sec. 22-24). Since Christian
Wolff the "primary" and the "secondary" natural law have become the "in-born" and the "acquired" human rights.
57 Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 5. It is interesting to see, in this connection, Rudolf von
Jhering's attitude towards the philosophy of law of St. Thomas Aquinas:
"This great mind correctly understood the realistic, practical and the social
factors of moral life, as well as the historical ... In amazement I ask myselfhow it is possible that such truths, once they were uttered, could be forgotten
so completely by our Protestant Savants? What false roads would have been
spared, had they taken them to heart! For my part, I should probably not
have written my book, had I known them; for the basic ideas I occupied
myself with are to be found in that gigantic thinker in perfect clearness and
in most -pregnant formulation." (Der Zweck im Recht, 3d edit. (Leipzig, 1898),
vol. II, p. 161 ff.)
58 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3.
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"the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to cer-
tain matters ... which perversion stood in need of correction."59 It is,
in short, the fall of man which perverted human nature, blurred his
reason, and weakened his will. 0 The human law is to enable disabled
persons to follow the dictates of the natural law.0 ' It is interesting to
note that the positive law of St. Thomas Aquinas not only safeguards
the natural law through the appliance of compulsion, but also supple-
ments the natural law by creating the "secondary natural law."
0' 2
Though the positive law is framed by man, it is not in the form
of an arbitrary command by a sovereign or despot, because all human
law must stand in close relationship to natural law. 3 Or, to be more
exact, all power to frame human law must be derived from natural
law.64 A law which is not in conformity with the natural law, is no
law at all. "The first rule of reason is the law of nature, . . . conse-
quently every human law has just as much of the nature of law, as it
is derived from the law of nature."0' 5
St. Thomas Aquinas also makes some very interesting observations
about the fact that all human law should be statutory, and unlike the
Anglo-American common law, not to be decided upon by judges. For in
the first place, it is more probable that a few wise men can be found
to frame the (statutory) laws, than it is that you could find all the
wise men that would be necessary to judge cases as they arose. Sec-
ondly, there is more time to think while making laws than while judg-
ing cases as they arise, and so the laws would be wiser. And most
important, they would be made in an abstract atmosphere, not under
the compulsion of human passions and prejudices of the moment. 6
According to St. Thomas Aquinas the human law must fulfill the
conditions requisite to a thing which has a purpose or an end. "It is
ordained to an end, and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a
higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine
law and the natural law. The end of human law is to be useful to
man. 0 7 There are three other conditions which must be fulfilled by
the human law. The first is that it shall be virtuous. Secondly, it must
be just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country,
and suitable to the time and place. And thirdly, it must be necessary,
useful, clearly expressed, and framed not for a private benefit, but
59Ibid., quaest. 94, art. 5. See also quaest. 93, art. 6; quaest. 94, art. 4.6o Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 6; quaest. 94, art. 4; art. 5; art. 6.
61 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 1.
62Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 94, art. 5; quaest. 95, art 2.
63 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 3; quaest. 94, art. 2; quaest. 95, art. 3; quaest. 92, art. 2.
64 Ibid., quaest. 93, art. 3; quaest. 95, art. 2.
05 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 2. See also quaest. 95, art. 3.
66 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 1. See also quaest. 91, art. 4.
07 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 3. See also quaest. 93, art. 3.
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solely for the common good.68 Without these conditions, a law is not
a law.' 9 He is fully aware that the general principles of natural law
cannot be applied to all men in the same way for all times and in all
places. Because of the great variety of human affairs, the human law
must vary among different peoples.7"
The statement that the human law must be framed for the com-
mon good, according to the custom of the country, and suitable to the
time and place, betrays a deep understanding of the social function
of the law. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, law is something per-
taining to reason "to direct to the end, which is the first principle in
all matters of action.171 "Now the first principle in practical matters,
which are the object of practical reason, is the last end: and the last
end of human life is bliss or happiness... Consequently the law must
needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since
every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, and
since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs
regard properly the relationship to universal happiness." 72 "Whenever
a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to
that end... Everything that is ruled and measured must have a form
proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are
verified in human law: since it is both something ordained to an end;
and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And
this higher measure is twofold, viz., the Divine law and the natural
law . . . Now the end of human law is to be useful to man . . ., viz.,
that it foster religion .... ; that it be helpful to discipline . .. ; and
that it further the common weal.
s7 3
"Since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other
precept in regard to some individual work must needs be devoid of
the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good." 74
For "every law is ordained to the common good.1 75 "Nothing stands
firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the
last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason
in this sense, has the nature of a law."76 Actions are indeed concerned
with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to
the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a
common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the
68 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 3.
09 Ibid., quaest. 92, art. 1; quaest. 95, art. 1.
70 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 2.
71 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 1.
72 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 2.
73 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 3.
74 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 2.
75Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 2. See also quaest. 90, art. 3; art. 4; quaest. 92, art. 1;
quaest. 95, art. 1; art. 3; quaest. 96, art. 1; art. 6.
76 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 2.
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common end."77 The common good is, therefore, the true "social good,"
regulated according to Divine justice ;78 it is the all pervading purpose
in the human law. This proves that St. Thomas Aquinas does not place
the individual interest, the right to free self-assertion, in the highest
place. 71 It is the social interest, the common good that is to be fostered,
even if the individual rights of man at times should suffer.8 0
The law must "take into account many things, as to persons, as to
matters, and as to times." '81 "Now it happens often that the observance
of some point of the law conduces to the common weal in the majority
of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. '82 Should such
a case arise, the law should not be observed, in order to maintain the
common weal which the lawgiver had in view.23 Thus equity or
"epikeia" '84 becomes part of the general scheme of justice of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Equity is a kind of justice which is not better than
all justice; but it is better than legal justice, "since it is not possible to
lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legisla-
tors in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although
if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of
justice and be injurious to the common good which the law has in
view. . . . In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it
is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of
justice and the common good. . . .To follow the letter of the law
when it ought not to be followed is sinful."8 5 Equity does not set
aside what is just, nor does it pass judgment on a law claiming that
it was not well made. It merely states that the law is not to be ob-
served in some particular instance. For "without doubt he transgresses
7 Ibid., quaest. 90, art. 2. In order to understand more fully the true meaning
of the Thomistic term, "common good," we should remember that, "the
goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole . . .Since
then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good,
unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be
well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the com-
mon good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizen be virtuous, at least
those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the
community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the com-
mands of their rulers." Ibid., quaest. 92, art. 1.
78 Ibid., quaest. 92, art. 1.
79 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 1.
80 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 2; quaest. 95, art. 3.
81 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 1.
82 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 6.
83 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 5.
8 St. Thomas Aquinas borrows this term from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,
book V, 10 ff.
85 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 120, art. 1; art. 2.
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the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the
intention of the lawgiver."8' 6 Thus equity is a kind of justice.,,
The principles of human law are derived from natural law, and
must be always in accordance with the Divine justice. This derivation
comes about in two ways-but both are based on the use of reason.
The first is purely deductive, demonstrable method, while the second
is an application of a principle to facts. "It must be noted that some-
thing may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a con-
clusion from premises, secondly, by determination of certain generali-
ties. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated
conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is
likened to that whereby . . . general forms are particularized as to
details; . . . Both modes of derivation are found in the human law.
But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in
human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some
force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in
the second way, have no other force than that of human law."'8
In applying human laws to everyday affairs St. Thomas Aquinas
finds that these human laws are general precepts. They would be of
little or no use if they controlled only single acts. Now human acts are
controlled through the decrees of "prudent men," and though these
decrees are not laws in the strict sense, they are, nevertheless, legal,
being applications of general laws to particular instances.8 9 Human
laws as well as decrees bind men in conscience if they are just; because
they are derived from the eternal law,90 and conform to the first
principles of natural law. In order to determine whether human laws
or human decrees are just, one must look first to its end, the common
good. For only if they are enacted to achieve that particular end can
they be called just.91 Furthermore, the law that is made may never
86 Ibid., quaest 120, art. 1. This sentence is exceedingly interesting because it
states the basic reason for the establishment of our own common law equity,
and the purpose behind its existence. In the old days when the Old English
Chancellor first started dispensing equity, he would essentially say in his in-junction, "We do not say you cannot have your common law right, but if
you insist on using it to defeat the ends of justice, you will have to do so in
the King's jail." Francois G6ny seems to have caught the spirit of St. Thomas
Aquinas's equity in his "Mdthode d'Interpr6tation et Sources on Drolt Priv6
Positive," vol. II, p. 100 ff. He says, "The judge asked to enunciate the law,
by supplementing the lack of, or by bridging the gaps in the formal sources
thereof . . . should take into account the inspiration of reason and of con-
science in order to probe the mistery of the 'just' before coming down to the
examination of the positive nature of things which will settle its diagnosis,
and will call into action the principle of reason . . . There are principles ofjustice superior to the contingencies of fact, and if facts determine the realiza-
tion of those principles, they do not contain their essence."
87 Ibid., quaest. 120, art. 2.
88 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 2.
89 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 1.
9oIbid., quaest. 93, art. 3; art. 4.
91Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 1.
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exceed the authority of the lawgiver. And finally, these laws or decrees
must not be discriminatory, but must apply to all "according to an
equality of proportion." 92 Consequently, a law is unjust if it is con-
trary to human good in any of the above mentioned ways,93 or even
more so, if it is opposed to the Divine good. 4 Now the unjust law not
only does not bind the moral conscience, but it should be ignored by
man, "provided he avoid giving scandal of inflicting a more grievous
hurt." But even if a law be just, still it is inevitable that in particular
cases it will work an injustice; because it is impossible to frame a law
that will be able to take account of all human "contingencies."99 Ordi-
narily the judge of whether a particular application of the law will be
unjust,97 should be some constituted authority. St. Thomas Aquinas is
fully aware that, if "the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay
involved by referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity frings
with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law."98
The mere application of human law is always a matter of rela-
tivity.9 9 Although the basic truths were absolute and immutable,
St. Thomas Aquinas realized that the means by which the absolute
purpose in the law-the common good-was to be achieved, depended
for their validity and force on whether, in each case, they served to
achieve this end.100 No human law is absolute in its application, but is
a relative good that has to show its worthiness before it has to be
obeyed.101
Unlike the Divine law, the human law is neither absolute nor un-
changeable. For human law is a dictate of human reason which is
fallible and changeable in that it gradually advances from the imper-
fect to the perfect. In this way alone, the human law would and does
change towards a better realization of the common good. On the other
hand, it is the nature of the human law to direct and regulate the acts
of man, and the law must, therefore, take account of man's progress
and changed conditions. As man's condition changes, his requirements
change, so that in this way, too, if the law would fulfill its purpose,
it must be subject to change.10 2 However, this change or evolution of
92Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 4.
93 Ibid., quaest. 92, art. 2.
94Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 4.
95 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 4. See also II. II., quaest. 104, art. 5.
96 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 57; 1. II., quaest. 93, art. 5; quaest. 94,
art. 4
97 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 120, art. 1.
98 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 96, art. 6. This is a very competent state-
ment of the familiar common law doctrine of an act privileged in an emer-
gency.
99 Ibid., quaest. 91, art. 1.
00 Ibid., quaest. 95, art. 3; quaest. 96, art. 1.
101 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 4.
102 Ibid., quaest. 97, art. 1.
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the law should be gradual. St. Thomas does not believe that the human
law should immediately be altered just as soon as something supposedly
better is found. For there are other problems that must be considered
besides the fact that in one particular instance a better rule has been
discovered. The basic purpose of the law, the common good must be
achieved at all costs. Only if the change of the law will serve this
purpose may it be undertaken at once. For in general, any change of
the law in itself may be detrimental to the common weal. The impor-
tance of the legal tradition, of stability and certainty, are not to be
overlooked, because they, in themselves, conduce to the common good.
A justification for changing the law exists only whe:e a new rule will
confer a very great and obvious benefit, or conversely, where the exist-
ing law is obviously unjust.1 0 3
"All law proceeds from the wisdom and will of the lawgiver; the
Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human
law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human
reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech,
so may they be known by deeds; since seemingly a man chooses as good
that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by human
speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it mani-
fests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore
by actions also, especially if they are repeated, so as to make a custom,
law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be estab-
lished which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external
actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are
most effectually declared; for when a thing is done again and again,
it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accord-
ingly, custom has the force, of a law, abolishes law, and is interpreter
of law."'1 4 The reason referred to in speaking of the customary law is
the "reason of the race," the "genius of a certain people." It is the
"reason" of living; the reason found in experience. In short, it is a
recognition of the value of a "common law" even in a "civil law"
community. 105
The human law makes for an equality among men, since all men,
except the person from whom the law derives its authority, are sub-
ject to it. Ih a particular instance, where the law fails in its intended
purpose, the ruler may give a dispensation so that a man will not
have to observe the law, and this is only when such a dispensation will
help to achieve the common good. Because even the ruler is subject
to the Divine and natural laws. 00
-03 Ibid., quaest. 97, art. 2.
104 Ibid., quaest. 97, art. 3.
'05 Ibid., quaest. 97, art. 3.
108Ibid., quaest. 97, art. 4; quaest. 96, art. 4.
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Justice according to St. Thomas Aquinas is "a habit whereby a
man renders to each one his due by constant and perpetual will."107
It is, therefore, a "habit" that rectifies the will. Justice is essentially a
relation to another. St. Thomas Aquinas concludes that Justice is a
general virtue, in that it directs the acts of all the virtues to the com-
mon good. But the fact that it is itself a general virtue does not mean
that it is the same as other virtues. "Not every moral virtue is about
pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear
and daring; but every moral virtue is directed to pain and pleasure as
to ends to be acquired. For pleasure and pain are the principal end
in respect of which we say that this is an evil and that a good: and
in this way they belong to justice."'10 Justice is concerned only with
external operations or relations between men, whereas the other moral
virtues are concerned with internal things-the passions and the like-
and the two are more or less mutually exclusive. But justice stands
foremost among moral virtues, because it aims for the common good,
while the other moral virtues deal with the good of the individual."' 0 9
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, law is part of morality. For
morality is divided into individual morality, law, and "practical mat-
ters," such as economics. The basic characteristic of the law is mainly
a negative one :11 it cannot contradict the principles of the natural
law, which is the moral law."' Because law itself must be virtu-
ous." 2 On the other hand, law is not empowered to prevent all evil,
or to achieve the good under all circumstances. "Human law does not
forbid all acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it pre-
scribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just
as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.""' 3 The human law is not
made for the virtuous, but, primarily, for the "average person.""i 4
"The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly,
but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imper-
fect men, the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz., that
they should abstain from all evil." 1 5 It would be unjust to apply a
system of law to all people-to the virtuous and to those lacking vir-
tue alikel"k-that would forbid all that is contrary to virtue. All the
107 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 58, art. 1. This definition is taken from:
Digest, i I, De Justitia et lure, 10; (Ulpian lib. I Regularum). "Justitia est
constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi."
1o Ibid., quaest. 58, art. 9. See also I. II., quaest. 90, art. 2.
Io9 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 58, art. 1-12.
110 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 92, art. 1; quaest. 96; art. 2.
Ill SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II. II., quaest. 77, art. 1; II. II., quaest. 104, art. 5.
112 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 3.
"13 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 3.
114 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 2; II. II., quaest. 69, art. 1; quaest. 78, art. 1; quaest.
77, art. 1.
115 SUMIA THEOLOGICA, I. II., quaest. 96, art. 2.
116 Ibid., quaest. 96, art. 5.
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human law can do is to prevent things which would upset human
society or the common good. For the human law does not compel in the
same manner as do morals." 7 The human law can try to bring about
the virtuous life of individuals,".8 but there is a higher realm for man
to attain, the possession of God. And this end is not attainable by the
purely natural powers of man, as expressed in the human law. It can
only be achieved with the assistance of God."19
117 Ibid., quaest. 96 art. 5.
s18 Ibid., quaest. 92, art. 1; quaest. 96; art. 2; art. 3.
119 Grabmann, M., "Thomas Aquinas" (transl. by V. Mitchell, Longman's, Green
& Co., 1928) p. 171.
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